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Dividing the Single Indivisible Transaction: 
Balancing the Interests of Mortgagees and Innocent Occupants 
 
Vincent Ooi1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
hen a mortgagee provides the funds necessary to purchase a property, the law protects the 
priority of the mortgagee’s security interest from any other interests in the property created 
after that property was purchased (unless consented to by the mortgagee). The House of 
Lords affirmed this principle in Abbey National Building Society v Cann (‘Cann’),2 and rejected the 
technical argument based on a scintilla temporis3 in favour of the policy argument concerning the need 
to ensure that housing loans are available and affordable. The effect of this principle is to allow the 
mortgagee to enforce the security interest in the property in the event of the mortgagor’s default, even 
if there are individuals with an equitable interest in the property and who are in actual occupation.  
The loan, the purchase of the property and the creation of the mortgage on the property are 
collectively considered by the law to be a single indivisible transaction, preventing any equitable 
interest from arising at any point between these stages. This is the first sense in which the transaction 
is said to be indivisible. The transaction is also indivisible in another sense, for the burden of the 
mortgagor’s default on the loan is subject to no apportionment in the event that he fails to meet his 
payment obligations. The mortgagee is allowed to enforce the security interest and the equitable 
interests of the occupants of the property are irrelevant at this stage. Yet, there are situations where one 
may question whether this leads to a fair outcome. Where the default on the mortgage occurs due to 
the fraud of the mortgagor, and the mortgagee ought to have known or suspected this, it is arguable 
that the ‘relatively innocent’ holder of the equitable interest should not have to suffer the full burden of 
the consequences of the default. This was the situation facing the House of Lords in Re North East 
Property Buyers Litigation (‘Scott’).4  
The term ‘one indivisible transaction’ was used multiple times in Scott. It is reasonable to 
think that their Lordships were concerned with the application of priority rules when they use the 
term. This article focuses on the two senses of ‘indivisibility’ of the single indivisible transaction and 
the obiter dicta of Baroness Hale in Scott, where she advanced arguments for adopting a less rigid 
approach to these two issues. For indivisibility in the first sense, Baroness Hale argued that the 
indivisibility of the transaction ‘depends on the facts’.5 As for indivisibility in the second sense, her 
Ladyship introduced the idea of ‘innocence as a comparative concept’ and insisted on a ‘middle group’.6 
This suggests her desire for the law to develop and allow division of the burden on the basis of relative 
fault. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Trinity College. I am very grateful to Elizabeth Drummond for all her insightful comments and guidance. I 
would also like to thank the editors of the Oxford University Undergraduate Law Journal for reviewing this article. 
2 [1991] 1 A.C. 56 (HL). 
3 Literally: ‘a spark of time’. The legal meaning of the term will be described in detail later in the article. 
4 [2014] UKSC 52, [2014] 3 W.L.R. 1163. The case is also commonly referred to as Scott v Southern Pacific 
Mortgages Ltd, being the only case of ten which was still outstanding when it reached the Supreme Court. 
5 Scott (n 4) [115]. 
6 ibid [122]. 
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Ultimately, it will be shown that while her Ladyship’s arguments may seem appealing, they 
represent a considerable deviation from the law at the present time. The apportionment of the burden 
of the mortgage default is essentially the key issue of concern as the ‘single indivisible transaction’ itself 
remains a valuable policy tool. This article will propose two statutory7 measures to allow the courts the 
discretion to spread the consequences of the fraud between the mortgagee and the holder of any 
equitable interest in the property. It is hoped that this will enable the courts to achieve fairer outcomes 
in such situations. However, it is acknowledged that until there is statutory intervention, there is little 
that the courts can do to help the innocent occupants within the existing framework of the law. Scott is 
unlikely to be the last word on this issue and it remains to be seen how ‘indivisibility’ in these two 
senses will be challenged and developed by both statutory and judicial means.  
 
A.  THE BACKGROUND: CANN 
The key facts of Cann are straightforward enough.8 George Cann obtained a loan from the Abbey 
National Building Society (‘AN’) to buy a leasehold house. This loan was secured by a mortgage on the 
property. Daisy (George’s mother) and Abraham Cann then moved into the house. Eventually, George 
defaulted on the payments of the loan and AN sought possession of the house. By way of defence, 
Daisy claimed that due to her financial contribution to a property previously bought jointly by George 
and herself, and given George’s assurance that she would always have a roof over her head, she had an 
equitable interest in the property. She then claimed that, by virtue of her actual occupation of the 
property, her equitable interest took priority over AN’s security interest.9 The House of Lords decided 
that the loan, the purchase of the property and the creation of the mortgage on the property were all a 
single indivisible transaction,10 rejecting the claim that Daisy’s equitable interest arose before the house 
was encumbered by the mortgage.  
It is reasonable to think that their Lordships considered the potential consequences of their 
decision on the availability and affordability of home loans. While accepting that the scintilla temporis 
might logically exist, they chose to give effect to ‘reality’ and held that the acquisition of the legal estate 
and the legal charge (mortgage) were ‘simultaneous and indissolubly bound together’.11 The interests of 
the individual holding the equitable interest in the property were subordinated to the public interest in 
the certainty of home mortgage transactions and in the availability of such mortgages. 
 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE SINGLE INDIVISIBLE TRANSACTION PRINCIPLE 
The single indivisible transaction principle was developed as a response to the argument for the 
existence of a scintilla temporis. The starting point to understanding the principle would undoubtedly 
be the Cann case itself where arguments for both sides were advanced. Here, the House of Lords 
approved the single indivisible transaction principle as being consistent with ‘reality’ and declared the 
scintilla temporis to be no more than ‘a legal artifice’.12 With the authority of the House of Lords, the 
issue was largely settled. Attempts to work around it were largely limited to trying to distinguish Cann 
rather than overrule it. In this sense, Scott is no exception, with their Lordships unanimously approving 
the principle.13  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is noted that Baroness Hale herself seemed to envisage a purely statutory solution, and noted that she was glad 
that the Law Commission would review the Land Registration Act 2002. See Scott (n 4) [122]. 
8 Cann (n 2) 59-61. 
9 Daisy invoked s 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925, which is in pari materia with Schedule 3 Paragraph 
2 LRA 2002. This will be discussed in detail later in the article. 
10 Cann (n 2) 92. 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid 93. 
13 Scott (n 4) [114]. 
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A.  THE OVERRIDING INTEREST OF ACTUAL OCCUPATION 
Consider three parties: A, the mortgagor of a property; B, the mortgagee of a property; and C, the 
owner of a beneficial interest in the property. C may have gained the beneficial interest from A in a 
variety of ways, whether by contribution to the purchase price of the property, through proprietary 
estoppel, by contract, or various other means. In order to purchase the property, A takes a loan from B 
and grants B a legal charge over the property as part of the mortgage agreement. A then defaults on 
the payments of the loan and B seeks possession of the property.  
The only way that C can defeat B’s claim to possession is by showing that he has an interest 
which has priority to B’s legal charge. However, s 29(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002 (‘LRA 
2002’) has the effect of postponing the priority of all unprotected interests in the land at the point of 
the mortgage to immediately after the legal charge. Essentially, if an interest is not protected, the legal 
charge will have priority to it.  
C’s interest will be protected if it is a registered charge or the subject of a notice in the 
register.14 Alternatively, C’s interest will also be protected if C is in actual occupation of the property 
and thus can prove that he has an overriding interest. The latter mechanism relies on s 29(2)(a)(ii) and 
Schedule 3, Paragraph 2 of the LRA 2002. If C can show that he has a proprietary interest,15 is in 
actual occupation of the property and does not fall foul of the additional exceptions in Schedule 3 
Subparagraphs 2(b) and (c),16 his interest will not be postponed in priority to after the execution of the 
legal charge. This interest can potentially bind B and defeat his claim to possession of the property.  
The crucial question then becomes: when did C’s beneficial interest arise? If it arose after the 
legal charge was granted, then there is no question of changing its priority, and the legal charge has 
priority to it. If, however, it arose before the legal charge was granted, then the actual occupation 
mechanism as previously described may help maintain its priority as against the legal charge.  
 
B.  UNDERSTANDING THE SCINTILLA TEMPORIS 
The House of Lords in Cann held that before the property was transferred to A, C could not possibly 
have had any proprietary interest in the property.17 A himself did not have any proprietary interest in 
the property and, consistent with the nemo dat principle,18 any interests he might have given to C were 
at best personal rights enforceable only against himself (and therefore incapable of binding third 
parties).19 It is only when A received the property that the equitable rights held by C could be ‘fed’ by 
the acquisition of the legal estate and become proprietary rights.20 Depending on when the estoppel 
was ‘fed’, C might have a proprietary interest which had priority to the legal charge.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 s 29(2)(a)(i). 
15 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 (HL) held that a purely personal right against A will 
not suffice. 
16 The actual occupation mechanism will be defeated if the following can be shown under subpara 2(b) that an 
inquiry was made of C and he failed to disclose the right when he could reasonably have done so. Alternatively, 
under subpara 2(c), the mechanism is defeated if C’s occupation would not have been obvious on a reasonably 
careful inspection of the land at the time of the disposition and if B did not have actual knowledge of his interest. 
17 Cann (n 2) 92. 
18 Nemo dat quod non habet (literally: ‘no one gives what he does not have’). 
19 Scott (n 4) [50]. Lord Collins here explains the decision in Cann. 
20 Cann (n 2) 89–90. The mechanism is explained in detail in Scott (n 4) [71]. 
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In Cann, counsel for C advanced the argument that ‘the transaction necessarily involved 
conveyancing steps which […] must be regarded as taking place in a defined order, so that there was a 
‘scintilla temporis’ between the purchaser's acquisition of the legal estate and the creation of the society's 
charge during which the estoppel could be fed’.21 In other words, there must have been a moment in 
time, however brief, where A held the fee simple of the property, unencumbered by the legal charge, 
after which the grant of the legal charge took effect. This moment in time was described as the scintilla 
temporis (the grant of the legal charge must necessarily have been executed after A received the fee 
simple of the property, for he could not grant it without first having a proprietary interest in the 
property).22 
If the scintilla temporis did indeed exist, then the estoppel would have been fed in that brief 
moment and C would have acquired a proprietary interest prior to the granting of the legal charge. 
The actual occupation mechanism as described earlier would then prevent s 29(1) LRA 2002 from 
postponing the priority of C’s interest to after that of the legal charge. C would be able to assert his 
proprietary rights against B, resisting B’s claim for possession. 
 
C.  REJECTION OF THE SCINTILLA TEMPORIS:  
THE SINGLE INDIVISIBLE TRANSACTION 
Their Lordships in Cann acknowledged the ‘attractive legal logic’ of this argument but ultimately 
rejected it as ‘flying in the face of reality’.23 Lord Oliver gave two main reasons for deciding that the 
acquisition of the legal estate and the legal charge were ‘simultaneous and indissolubly bound together’. 
The first reason was that the acquisition of the legal estate was entirely dependent upon the funds from 
B. It would arguably not be fair to subordinate B’s security interest to C’s equitable interests where C 
would never have obtained the equitable interest without B’s loan in the first place. The second reason 
given was that in most cases, conveyancing practice was that the documents for the legal charge would 
have been executed before the transfer of the legal estate to A (in terms of the sequence of execution of 
documents, not their legal effect). To say that the law logically required a different ordering of the 
stages would be to ignore what actually happens in practice and to insist on a technicality.  
Lord Oliver then neatly summed up the effect of the single indivisible transaction, explaining 
that A ‘never in fact acquires anything but an equity of redemption’.24 If A receives the legal estate 
when it was already burdened with the legal charge of B, then he cannot possibly go on to give any 
right to C which has priority over that of B’s legal charge. Accordingly, C has no interest which 
priority might be protected by the actual occupation mechanism. The legal charge has priority over C’s 
equitable interests and B’s claim for possession will succeed.  
 
III.  DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW AFTER CANN 
A.  THE BACKGROUND: SCOTT 
In order to understand Scott fully, it is necessary to appreciate the context in which the cases arose. 
‘Sale and rent back’ schemes (‘SRB’) are arrangements designed and marketed by private companies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Cann (n 2) 90. 
22 ibid 101. 
23 ibid 92. 
24 ibid 93. 
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The company arranges purchases a property from the homeowner using a loan from a bank secured by 
the property itself. As the company promises to give the homeowner an extended lease (sometimes a 
life interest) in the property, the homeowner is attracted by the prospect of obtaining quick money 
while still being able to reside in the property. In return, the company charges the homeowner a hefty 
‘fee’, deducted from the purchase price of the property.25  
Even if the commercial viability of such schemes were not seriously questionable, the 
arrangement has some serious problems. First of all, in order to get the loan from the bank, the 
company is normally asked to declare that there are no outstanding leases on the property beyond 12 
months.26 This is standard bank policy and the companies would have to make a false declaration in 
order to get the loan in the first place. Secondly, there is a nasty tendency of the companies to suddenly 
abscond once they received their ‘fee’.  
Scott is a typical SRB case, with the original homeowner, Rosemary Scott (‘RS’), effectively 
agreeing to sell her house to Amee Wilkinson (‘AW’) at a price substantially below the market rate, 
having been promised the right to indefinite occupation at a discounted rent. Amee took out a loan 
from Southern Pacific Mortgages Ltd (‘SP’), using the house as collateral and then promptly defaulted 
on the payments and disappeared.  
Our previous model involving A, B and C remains valid, though with some additional 
information. C is a homeowner who sells the property to A. The beneficial interest that C obtains 
from A in this case results from representations made by A that he will grant a lease to C so that he 
can stay in his own property even after the sale (raising a proprietary estoppel). As before, A then 
defaults on the mortgage payments and, in this case, disappears. 
 
B.  THE SUPREME COURT IN SCOTT CONSIDERS CANN 
The facts in Scott were different from those in Cann and the Supreme Court considered two main 
questions:27  
1) Whether A could grant proprietary, as opposed to merely personal, rights to C before he 
acquired the legal estate; and  
2) Even if C had proprietary rights, whether Cann applied to prevent him from asserting an 
equitable right that had arisen only on completion. 
The key difference between the two cases lies in the contract signed in Scott. Counsel for RS in Scott 
argued that her interest arose pre-completion and that this enabled them to distinguish Cann. They 
effectively argued that since her interest existed during the period between contract and conveyance, it 
slipped in before the legal charge took effect.  
The argument is based on the existence of a vendor-purchaser constructive trust. The roots of 
a vendor-purchaser constructive trust can be found in the case of Lysaght v Edwards,28 where Jessel MR 
held that once there is a ‘valid contract for sale, the vendor becomes in equity a trustee for the 
purchaser of the estate sold, and the beneficial ownership passes to the purchaser’.29  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 It is noted that since 1 July 2009, the Financial Conduct Authority has regulated firms that offer SRB. The 
interim scheme ran from 1 July 2009 and was replaced by the current scheme on 30 June 2010.  
Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Sale and rent back’ <http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/financial-services-
products/mortgages/sale-and-rent-back> accessed 1 July 2015.  
26 Scott (n 4) [5]. 
27 ibid [10]. 
28 (1876) 2 Ch D 499 (Ch). 
29 ibid 506. 
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Applying this to the facts of Scott, AW would have had a beneficial (and proprietary) interest 
in the property before completion, with (rather counterintuitively on the facts) RS as the trustee of that 
interest. AW’s promise to RS would then be capable of giving RS a proprietary interest, since AW 
would have had a sufficient interest in the property from which to make that gift at the time.  
The argument based on a vendor-purchaser constructive trust was rejected by both Lord 
Collins and Baroness Hale, though their reasoning differed. Lord Collins held that the ‘contract, 
conveyance and mortgage are indivisible’30 and that ‘it would be wholly unrealistic to treat the contract 
for present purposes as a divisible element in this process’.31 Thus, the interest granted by A to C can 
only be personal in nature until such point where A is conveyed the legal estate. Then the estoppel is 
‘fed’ and C’s beneficial interest gains proprietary character.32 Lord Collins then held that Cann would 
apply to Scott, with the effect that the acquisition of the legal estate and the grant of the charge would 
be one indivisible transaction.33 Baroness Hale rejected the constructive trust argument on the basis 
that ‘the purchaser of land cannot create a proprietary interest in the land, which is capable of being an 
overriding interest, until his contract has been completed’.34 
 
C.  DOES SCOTT GO FURTHER THAN CANN?  
STILL AN INDIVISIBLE TRANSACTION 
From this point onwards, everything their Lordships considered is strictly speaking obiter dicta, since 
the legal issues in Scott were resolved when Lord Collins held that A could not grant proprietary rights 
to C before he acquired the legal estate. The case was decided solely by answering the first question, 
rendering the answer to the second question (with all the discussion of indivisibility) inconsequential.35 
However, it will soon be apparent that the obiter dicta in this case provides much more fertile ground 
for analysis and development of the law than the rationes, which does little more than affirm Cann.  
Lord Collins went on to consider whether the single indivisible transaction analysis extends to 
situations where the equitable interest is said to arise at the time of the contract of sale.36 He affirmed 
the judgment of Aldous LJ in Nationwide Anglia Building Society v Ahmed37 that it was implicit in Cann 
that contract, conveyance and mortgage are indivisible.38 Lord Collins conceded that the contract of 
sale has separate legal effects, but argued that it would be wholly unrealistic to treat the contract for 
present purposes as a divisible element in the process.39 Lord Collins thus seemed to think that there is 
in substance a single indivisible transaction which effectively prevents any beneficial interest of C from 
ever having priority over B’s legal charge in such ‘mortgage situations’, regardless of the time between 
each individual component of the transaction.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Scott (n 4) [85]. 
31 ibid [87]. 
32 Scott (n 4) [71]–[72]. 
33 ibid (n 4) [79]. 
34 ibid [122]. 
35 It is noted that Lord Wilson and Lord Reed expressly acknowledged that the indivisibility of the contract from 
the conveyance and the mortgage was not part of the reasons for the decision. See Scott (n 4) [123]. 
36 Scott (n 4) [70]. In doing so, he accepts that his statements are made obiter. 
37 (1995) 70 P & CR 381 (CA). 
38 Scott (n 4) [85]. 
39 ibid [87]. 
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IV.  THE FIRST SENSE OF ‘INDIVISIBILITY’:   
DIVIDING THE TRANSACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS 
Baroness Hale’s dicta in Scott are by far the most interesting and have the most potential for 
development. As far as the rationes of the case went, she agreed with Lord Collins’ judgment. 
However, with respect to Lord Collins’ dicta on the single indivisible transaction, she preferred to 
adopt a different and more flexible approach.40 It is noted that she had the support of the majority of 
the Supreme Court on this point, with Lord Wilson and Lord Reed supporting her41 and Lord Collins 
and Lord Sumption taking a different position.  
There are two points being considered here. Baroness Hale seemed firm on the first point, 
namely, that the contract, conveyance and mortgage do not constitute a single indivisible transaction. 
She insisted that there is no ‘tripartite transaction to which vendor, purchaser and lender are all 
party’.42 In addition, she considered that to insist that these factors constitute a single indivisible 
transaction would be to ‘fly in face of the facts’ and ‘create confusion’.43 On the other hand, she seemed 
willing to accept that the conveyance and mortgage may constitute a single indivisible transaction, 
albeit that this depends on the facts.44 On the first point, Baroness Hale presented a persuasive 
argument45 and this article will not address it further.  
 
A.  DEPENDING ON THE FACTS 
On the second point, the single indivisible transaction rule in Cann was thought to apply to all cases 
where A took out a mortgage with B to purchase the property. However, Baroness Hale held that this 
need not be the case in every situation. She held that ‘not all conveyances are indivisible: it depends on 
the facts’.46 While we were not told what characteristics will persuade the court to depart from the 
general finding of an indivisible transaction, Baroness Hale provided us with at least one situation. She 
confirmed that ‘if the mortgage takes place sometime after the conveyance, there may be a period 
during which the purchaser owns the land without encumbrances’.47 The difficulty with this statement 
is that it provides little guidance as to how long ‘sometime’ might be.   
Baroness Hale’s assessment of the Cann line of cases may shed some light on what is required 
to show that there was no indivisible transaction. She held that in the cases of Coventry48, Woolwich49, 
Piskor50 and Cann the conveyance and the mortgage were virtually contemporaneous and the mortgage 
loan was required to complete the transaction.51 Her Ladyship also accepted that in Ahmed52 there was 
an indivisible transaction because the transactions all took place on the same day and each of the 
participants knew what the terms of the arrangements were.53  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Scott (n 4) [95]. 
41 ibid [123]. 
42 ibid [119]. 
43 ibid [120]. 
44 ibid [115]. 
45 ibid [116], [119]–[120]. The most persuasive argument is that the contract to sell the land is an entirely separate 
matter from the mortgage and the conveyance. There is no reason for the default position to be that they all 
occurred simultaneously. Technically speaking, for the single indivisible transaction rule to exist, B and C need not 
even know that the other exists, let alone that A and B have made a contract together.  
46 Scott (n 4) [115]. 
47 ibid. 
48 Coventry Permanent Economic Building Society v Jones and Others [1951] 1 All ER 901 (Ch). 
49 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Marshall [1952] Ch 1 (HL). 
50 Church of England Building Society v Piskor [1954] Ch 553 (CA). 
51 Scott (n 4) [109]. 
52 ibid. 
53 ibid [121]. 
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There is also Baroness Hale’s assessment that Universal Permanent Building Society v Cooke54 
may not have been wrongly decided, indicating that her Ladyship agreed with the principles laid down 
in Cooke. Therefore, in order to understand the factors that determine whether an indivisible 
transaction exists, it is useful to analyse Cooke.  
The facts of Cooke are briefly stated as follows. Cooke leased out her flat to Gavine on a 
weekly tenancy before obtaining the fee simple of the property. Cooke was conveyed the fee simple of 
the property on 28 December 1948 and mortgaged the property the following day. She subsequently 
defaulted on her payments of the loan and the bank sought possession. Gavine argued that she had a 
tenancy by estoppel and sought to resist the order for possession. The Court of Appeal held that there 
was nothing to suggest that the conveyance and the mortgage were part of a single transaction.55 It 
found itself bound on the facts of the case to deem the two transactions as being two independent 
transactions, the mortgage taking place a day after the conveyance.56 
Regarding the case of Cooke, Baroness Hale seemed to think that it can be argued that the 
transaction was not indivisible because the transaction was not contemporaneous (mortgage executed 
one day after the conveyance) and because there was no evidence that the mortgage was required for 
the purchase.57 Baroness Hale did not commit herself to a position, though she noted that it was likely 
that the House of Lords in Cann knew about Cooke and did not expressly overrule it or even mention 
it.58  
This suggests three factors which militate towards a finding of an indivisible transaction: 1) 
The transactions took place contemporaneously (on the same day), 2) the mortgage loan was required 
to complete the transaction; and 3) each of the parties knew what the terms of the arrangements were.  
The first possible distinguishing factor of Cooke is intellectually unsatisfying. To argue that a 
transaction is divided and not a single whole simply because the constituent procedures were 
completed a single day apart is a highly doubtful proposition. If the law is willing to accept that the 
scintilla temporis argument is a mere technicality, then it should similarly be willing to look past a single 
day’s delay and assess the substance of the transaction. Lord Collins also seemed unconvinced that 
counting the number of days between the constituent procedures is a good way to go about assessing 
the transactions as well. He noted that while in Ahmed, the contract and conveyance were executed on 
the same day, the (indivisible transaction) analysis is not dependant on that.59  
The second possible distinguishing factor of Cooke may be more promising. If the mortgage is 
not required for the purchase of the property, then the conveyance and the mortgage will not be part of 
a single indivisible transaction. This factor seems to make perfect sense. The very reason for insisting 
on a single indivisible transaction in Cann itself was because the acquisition of the legal estate is 
entirely dependent on the provision of funds from the lender.60 However, what this really suggests is 
not that Cooke is an exception to the single indivisible transaction rule in Cann, but that Cooke was 
never caught by the rule in the first place. Cann only applies where the mortgage is required to acquire 
the property. This point has been uncontroversially accepted since Cann itself.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 [1952] Ch 95 (CA). 
55 Cooke (n 54) 101. 
56 ibid. 
57 Scott (n 4) [110]. 
58 ibid. 
59 Scott (n 4) [85]. 
60 Cann (n 2) 92. 
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The third possible distinguishing factor is reasonable. If the innocent occupant in particular 
knew about the terms of the arrangements, one might reasonably expect him to raise the issue of his 
equitable interests to the mortgagee. Remaining silent about the false pretences on the basis of which 
the loan was obtained (if not for the false pretences, the loan would not be given in such 
circumstances) leaves open the accusation that one is an accomplice to a fraud. However, though 
knowledge of the terms of the arrangement is a strong factor for finding that there was a single 
indivisible transaction, it is not clear that the reverse applies. The existing framework and rationale for 
the single indivisible transaction is largely based on conveyancing practice and policy arguments, not 
fault arguments. It is only when there is sufficient fault to vitiate the contract that it becomes relevant. 
Even if the innocent occupant did not know the full terms of the arrangements, this does not affect the 
realities of conveyancing practice or policy justifications in any way. If fault arguments are to be 
introduced, it is argued that they are better considered at the stage of apportioning the burden of the 
transaction rather than when dealing with the quite technical point regarding whether the transaction 
is indivisible or not. These arguments will be considered later.  
After analysing all the cases, Baroness Hale’s statement that things will be ‘dependent on the 
facts’ really provides us with no more information than the statement itself. We have no guidance as to 
when this exception might apply or whether there might even be any cases where the exception could 
apply at all. At its narrowest interpretation, we might construe the statement as stating that the single 
indivisible transaction rule does not apply to cases where the mortgage is not required to purchase the 
property; a largely redundant statement.  
Of course the statement can be interpreted in a far wider manner than that. With no guidance 
as to what ‘dependent on the facts’ mean, the courts now have the potential to make decisions in a 
more flexible manner. However, bearing in mind that Baroness Hale’s statements are non-binding 
dicta and that they do not provide much guidance, it is highly unlikely that any subordinate court 
would be too keen to prioritise it over Cann, which is technically very much still good law. It seems 
that this attempt at ‘division’ of the single indivisible transaction is unlikely to have any significant 
impact on the law.  
 
V.  THE SECOND SENSE OF ‘INDIVISIBILITY:  
DIVIDING THE BURDEN OF THE TRANSACTION 
At the end of her judgment, Baroness Hale expressed some uneasiness about the decision. She noted 
that the law insisted on an ‘all or nothing’ approach.61 Either C could prove that there was some reason 
in equity to restrain B from enforcing the security as against C’s right altogether, or B would be able to 
totally disregard C’s rights and enforce its security. As far as equitable remedies in such situations go, 
the law has been unwilling to depart from this ‘all or nothing’ approach and apportion the burden of 
loss between the two (relatively) innocent parties once the third party has either absconded or been 
made insolvent. In TSB Bank Plc v Camfield62 the court insisted that it had no power to award partial 
rescission.63 To the court, rescission was an all or nothing process and the right of the representee and 
not of the court. The court could not grant equitable relief to which terms may be attached.64 
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62 [1995] 1 WLR 430 (CA). 
63 ibid 436. 
64 ibid 438-439. 
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A.  UNDERSTANDING THE HARSHNESS OF THE LAW 
In 2013, there were more than 220,000 claims for possession made in England and Wales65 as 
mortgagors defaulted on their loans. Since Cann was decided, there have been other cases where the 
security has been successfully enforced by the banks with no compensation to the occupants of the 
properties with beneficial interests. While the loss of a family home is one which undoubtedly evokes a 
sense of sympathy, the courts have long since steeled themselves against prioritising the few individuals 
before them, aware of the consequences on the rest of society if they did so. It is thus interesting that 
the Supreme Court, the barristers involved in the case, and the majority of authors writing on this issue 
have felt that the victims in Scott and the ‘sale and rent back’ cases deserve special sympathy.  
The special element which seems to evoke such sympathy is likely to be the fact that the 
homeowners affected by such schemes were victims of fraud. The victims were promised money and 
the right to stay for extended periods in their properties (sometimes for life). They never for a moment 
thought that they would be evicted from their own homes. There is a fundamental (and emotive) 
difference between on the one hand moving into a new property with the expectation of a proprietary 
right and then being denied performance of that expectation, and being evicted from one’s own home 
after receiving express assurances that this would not happen on the other. Lord Collins himself noted 
that even if the victims receive monetary compensation, it does not change the fact that they have lost 
their homes.66  
 
B.  IS THE LAW REALLY THAT HARSH? 
The full picture is a little more complicated than that. Thomas Tyson argues that the whole structure 
of a ‘sale and rent back’ transaction is a ‘preposterous’ and ‘eminently resistible’ one.67 The vendor 
releases some equity in the property, but receives little in return.68 Tyson compares the deal to one to 
exchanging a cow for some magic beans,69 implying that the promised leases and/or bonus payments 
are simply too good to be true. One cannot help but feel that caveat emptor may be an apt expression in 
these cases.  
As to monetary compensation, it is unlikely that the mortgagors who organised the whole 
scheme will be found or indeed be solvent on any level. But that does not mean that the victims are 
totally bereft of any remedy. Lord Collins noted that the victims may have claims against the Solicitors’ 
Compensation Fund70 and it is always possible that professional negligence claims may be brought. It 
is possible that there will be some negligence or wrongdoing on the part of the solicitors, whether it 
lies in being accomplices to the mortgagors or failing to give proper advice to the victims. All things 
considered, there is probably still a need for the law to intervene to help these victims as these remedies 
are inadequate. However, they should be considered as part of the overall compensation framework.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Ministry of Justice ‘Mortgage and Landlord Possession Statistics Quarterly: October to December 2013’ 
(Ministry of Justice Statistics Bulletin, 13 February 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279342/mortgage-landlord-
possession-statistics-oct-dec-2013.pdf> accessed 1 July 2015. 
66 Scott (n 4) [24]. 
67 Thomas Tyson ‘Magic beans for that cow? Scott v Southern Pacific Mortgages [2014] UKSC 52’ (Zenith 
Chambers News and Articles, 24 October 2014) 
<http://www.zenithchambers.co.uk/cms/document/scott_v_southern_pacific_article.pdf>  accessed 1 July 2015. 
68 ibid  
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C.  INNOCENCE AS A COMPARATIVE CONCEPT 
When arguing for a middle ground approach between the ‘all or nothing’ approach of the current law, 
Baroness Hale advanced an approach that would use relative fault to apportion the burden of the loss 
between B and C.71 She argued that there might be a point where a vendor who has been tricked out of 
her property can assert her rights even against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee.72 From the point 
of view of the lenders, she argued that there might be a point where the claims of lenders who have 
failed to heed the obvious warning signs that would have told them the borrower was not a good risk 
should be postponed to those of vendors who have been made promises that the borrowers cannot 
keep.73  Baroness Hale then expresses her approval of the plans of the Law Commission to review the 
impact of fraud in the LRA 2002.74 These statements make it apparent that her Ladyship was 
concerned mainly with fraud as the ground for granting equitable relief.  
Baroness Hale argued that lenders may relatively be at fault when they fail to heed the 
‘obvious warning signs’ that the borrower was not a good risk.75 This statement has the potential to 
produce very controversial outcomes. It seems to suggest that even if B has no knowledge of the 
situation, vulnerabilities or even existence of C, B’s actions may constitute sufficient ‘fault’ to make it 
bear some of the losses. It is argued here that even if we are to use a concept of ‘comparative 
innocence’, any ‘fault’ on the part of the parties must be sufficiently linked to the other party they are 
splitting the losses with. So, it is less controversial to suggest that if B knew or should have known that 
C would potentially suffer loss from his actions, we might want to impose duties to C on B.76 Undue 
influence works in a similar manner and we can understand how the concept of constructive notice 
works.77 It is far more controversial, however, to suggest that B, potentially having no knowledge of the 
existence of C, should effectively owe a duty to C to heed the ‘obvious warning signs’ given by A. In 
equity (fiduciary duties) and in tort (negligence) it is rare for one to owe a duty to a party whose 
existence one is unaware of, even as part of a class of persons. Simply put, if B does not know that C 
exists, B can act solely in his own interests without having to worry about the interests of any third 
parties.  
It would be a lot less controversial to suggest that Baroness Hale’s ‘comparative innocence’ 
concept should be restricted to cases where B knows or at least suspects the existence of C. On the 
other hand, while C inevitably knows of the existence of B in such cases, that need not be a 
requirement. One need not know of a duty’s existence to be owed a duty.  
In practice, lenders are rather keen to ensure that they get good security for their loans. It is 
most unlikely that they will grant loans to borrowers who are ‘obviously not good risks’. Furthermore, 
standard mortgage terms generally permit only shorthold tenancies of fixed term no more than 12 
months.78  If there were clear signs that A was making a false declaration on the form or intending to 
break this term, it is unlikely that any bank would have granted him the loan. The prospect of not 
having the right to vacant possession is not a welcome one, and few lenders would knowingly walk into 
a transaction like that. The whole reason why the transaction occurred in the first place was due to the 
lack of full disclosure by A to B.  Hence, the kind of transactions that are likely to arise in practice are 
cases of constructive notice, where the mortgagee should have known about the risks in granting the 
mortgage but still went ahead. This may occur due to poor design of the system, human error or just 
plain negligence (in the ordinary sense of the word).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Scott (n 4) [122]. 
72 Emphasis added. 
73 Scott (n 4) [122]. 
74 Law Commission, Twelfth Programme of Law Reform (Law Com No 354, 2014) paras 2.13- 2.16. 
75 Scott (n 4) [122]. 
76 Indeed this seems to be the rationale behind the exceptions in Schedule 3 paragraph 2, LRA 2002. 
77 See Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A.C. 180 (HL) and Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) and other 
appeals [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773. Etridge is the leading case. 
78 Scott (n 4) [5]. 
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D.  EXISTING COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
The closest existing common law principles potentially available to protect the victims are those of 
unconscionability, undue influence and misrepresentation. However, none of them really seems 
applicable to the situation, and even so, on the authority of TSB v Camfield, all of them entail ‘all or 
nothing’ remedies. As there is no direct contractual relationship between B and C, and quite possibly 
no dealings at all between them at all, a successful plea of any of these vitiating factors would merely 
render the contract between A and C voidable. As the legal charge has already been granted to B, this 
would not assist C.  
While the doctrine of constructive notice in undue influence may seem more promising in 
such cases, the fact remains that B and C have no contractual relationship and constructive notice has 
not yet been expanded to include cases where there is no contractual relationship between the victim 
and the party with supposed constructive notice. The contracts are between A and B, and between A 
and C. Even if B knows or ought to have known about C’s situation, there is no scope for the 
application of undue influence principles. What Baroness Hale was considering is a form of action 
which can work even when the only link between B and C is their link with A. The common law 
currently does not provide a remedy to C against B in such a situation. A statutory solution will indeed 
be required. A ‘proposed statute’ will be considered later in this article. Before it is covered in detail, 
the necessary characteristics of this hypothetical ‘proposed statute’ will be discussed. 
 
E.  APPORTIONMENT OF LOSSES: A LESSON FROM HISTORY 
If such a situation seems familiar, it is because this is not the first time that the courts have had to deal 
with the issue of apportionment of the burden of loss between two (relatively) innocent parties. 
Roughly half a century ago, Devlin LJ expressed his dissatisfaction with the ‘all or nothing’ approach in 
Ingram v Little,79 a case concerning mistake of identity involving a fraudster who then dropped out of 
the picture. As is currently being done with this issue, the issue then was taken up by the Law 
Commission, which published their response in their Twelfth Report (Transfer of Title to Chattels 
(Cmnd 2958, 1966)).80 The idea of apportioning losses flowing from cases of mistake was rejected by 
the Law Commission. Diamond argues that the rejection was largely based on two grounds. The first 
ground was that a power of apportionment would result in uncertainty following from the grant of a 
wide and virtually unrestrained judicial discretion. The second ground was the insistence of the Law 
Commission that in cases where both parties were innocent, the loss should lie where it falls.81  
A good half a century has passed since that report. Also, the subject matter here, being land, 
is likely to raise very different considerations.82 However, it is important for us to consider the reasons 
for the rejection of a very similar power to apportion losses in the law of mistake. The second ground 
of rejection of the proposal is unlikely to be an issue here. Baroness Hale implied that such a power 
should only be exercised where there is not only relative fault, but apparently a rather high level of 
relative fault on the part of the lenders.83 As regards the first ground of rejection, certainty in the law is 
of paramount importance in ensuring that the home loans and mortgages system flows smoothly. The 
question we have to ask is: ‘will the proposed statute create an acceptable level of uncertainty this time?’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 [1961] 1 QB 31 (CA). 
80 Aubrey Diamond summarised and commented on the report under the Reports of Committees section of the 
Modern Law Review; see further (1966) 29 MLR 418. 
81 ibid 414. 
82 The difference in treatment of legal issues relating to land as compared with the other areas of private law is well 
established and (largely) well justified. For an in depth consideration of this point, see Peter Birks, ‘Before We 
Begin: Five Keys to Land Law’ in Bright and J Dewar (eds) Land Law: Themes and Perspectives (OUP 1998). 
83 Scott (n 4) [122]. 
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It is tempting to argue that since ‘sale and rent back’ transactions are now regulated by the 
Financial Conduct Authority84 and the market has in practice shut down,85 we should compensate the 
victims of such transactions as it would be unlikely to affect the supply of home loans.86 However, there 
are a significant number of fraud cases in property transactions each year. Any attempts to restrict the 
effect of the proposed statute to only ‘sale and rent back cases’ will be open to the fair criticism of being 
unprincipled. It is highly difficult to justify theoretically why victims of such schemes in particular will 
have a new remedy available to them while it is denied to the victims of other kinds of fraud in 
property transactions. The danger is that, in trying to do justice to a small group of people we end up 
distinguishing the law in unprincipled ways, or worse, changing the law such that it affects confidence 
in standard commercial transactions and does more harm than good.  
On the other hand, if we were to expand the scope of the proposed statute to include fraud in 
property transactions in general, it would be difficult to control the level of uncertainty generated. 
Unlike transactions tainted by undue influence, it is impossible for lenders to effectively screen such 
transactions. In undue influence cases, there is at least some form of dealings between the lender and 
the victim making it potentially reasonable for us to attribute constructive notice to the lenders and 
thereby protect the victim’s interest should the lenders not discharge their duties in ensuring that the 
victim is properly legally advised. Fraud cases have a wide variety of forms and B and C need not even 
have met or had any dealings with each other at all in some of these situations. 
 
F.  STATIC AND DYNAMIC SECURITY 
We are faced once again with the one of the core problems of land law, that of balancing static and 
dynamic security. Very briefly, static security involves a preference for protecting the title of the 
original owner against subsequent purchasers, whereas dynamic security involves protecting the 
subsequent purchasers instead. The decision to prioritise dynamic security was already made with the 
passing of the LRA 2002,87 with Parliament weighing the options and accepting that there might be a 
few cases where property owners would be disadvantaged by the rules.  The intention behind s 29 and, 
more broadly, the LRA 2002 itself, was that the old doctrines of notice (and particularly, constructive 
notice) should no longer apply.88 Excepting the concession of overriding interests, buyers should simply 
be able to rely on the Register when making their decisions as to the property. The ‘relative fault’ that 
is considered when apportioning losses under the proposal is most likely to come from judgments as to 
what B knew or should have known about C and his situation.89 This completely goes against the 
intention behind the 2002 Act as it effectively requires B to investigate C’s situation. This more or less 
resurrects the old doctrine of notice, something which was expressly removed by the 2002 Act.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Since 2009, initially by the Financial Services Authority under s 19, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
This is now governed by the Financial Conduct Authority.  
85 Scott (n 4) [2]. 
86 Given that such transactions effectively no longer exist, even if the banks tightened their loans criteria for such 
transactions, it would not make much difference to the market.  
87 This is inherent in numerous provisions in the LRA 2002, including s 26, s 29, s 58. For a more in-depth 
consideration, see Amy Goymour [2013] CLJ 617. 
88 Law Commission, Land Registration for the 21st Century: A Consultative Document (Law Com No 254, 1998) 
paras 3.44 – 3.50. 
89 It was noted earlier that it would be controversial to allocate liability to B where B does not know of C’s 
existence.  
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It is noted that Baroness Hale and the Law Commission may have had different things in 
mind when her Ladyship made her comments about the Law Commission’s plans. With the 
developments in how the courts now deal with the impact of fraud on the Land Register (see the 
Malory90 and Fitzwilliam91 line of cases), it is likely that the focus of the Law Commission will be on 
fraud which results in void dispositions and its impact on the register and the application of Schedule 4 
and Schedule 8 of the LRA 2002. Baroness Hale’s statement may now prompt the Law Commission 
to look into this particular area, but it is likely that when the statement was made, the Law 
Commission intended to review the law on fraud pertaining to land registration rather than on the 
allocation of losses in cases of fraud. It is expected that the Report, when published, will still 
predominantly focus on the former issue. 
In summary, it is argued that the fully understandable sympathy which Baroness Hale and the 
rest of the Supreme Court felt for the victims of ‘sale and buy back’ schemes should not be translated 
into any changes in the law. Parliament has already made its decision (twice, if we count the proposals 
on reforming the law of mistake) that an ‘all or nothing’ approach is justified on pragmatic grounds. 
The dicta of Baroness Hale do not seem to have added any substantial fresh ideas to this debate. One 
suspects that the Law Commission will make a critical and thorough assessment of the issue and come 
to the same conclusion which its predecessors did half a century ago.  
 
G.  MITIGATING THE HARSHNESS AND THE POWER  
TO MAKE DISCRETIONARY ORDERS 
As noted earlier, the primary loss to the victims is likely to be their eviction from their property. 
Barring those cases where the solicitor lacked professional indemnity insurance or was truly free from 
any wrongdoing, the victims may receive compensation from either the Solicitors’ Compensation Fund 
or as a result of professional negligence claims. This provides Parliament with an opportunity to assist 
these victims.  
A potentially acceptable solution might be to confer upon the courts the power to exercise discretion 
to: 
1) Freeze any attempts to take possession of or sell the mortgaged property until the conclusion 
of any proceedings by the victims to seek compensation from A and/or B (proceedings to be 
brought in a reasonable amount of time);92 and  
2) Order a sale of the property to the victims at fair market value within a reasonable time from 
the conclusion of the abovementioned proceedings.  
B should be able to claim a fair interest rate for the loan (which C should have to pay regardless of 
whether C eventually buys the property back or not), which C in turn should be able to claim in the 
compensation proceedings. The idea is for the victims to be in a position to use their compensation to 
purchase their property back. It is noted that since C did receive some money in the initial transaction 
(which has probably already been spent), C may need to take out a loan in order to make up for that 
shortfall and buy back the property. Unfortunately, if the victims were themselves substantially at fault 
and/or it is not possible to extract any compensation from the solicitors involved, the victims may have 
to bear the full losses themselves. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Malory Enterprises Ltd v Cheshire Homes (UK) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 151, [2002] Ch. 216 
91 Fitzwilliam v Richall Holdings Services Ltd [2013] EWHC 86 (Ch), [2013] 1 P. & C.R. 19 
92 The solution would fundamentally be an equitable remedy and equitable laches would probably apply.  
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H.  ALTERNATIVE MEASURES 
While the idea of dividing the burden of the transaction between B and C has been largely rejected in 
this article, it is possible to envisage some models for doing so. There are two kinds of potential losses 
suffered. One is the loss of possession of the property (which cannot be apportioned), while the other 
is the pecuniary loss suffered due to the transaction. The two models based on tort and equity allow for 
C to be compensated by B, regardless of whether the solicitor is additionally liable for damages. C will 
not be allowed to recover an amount greater than his loss from B and the solicitor. Where relevant, B 
and the solicitor can then bring proceedings to apportion the losses between themselves.  
Two measures will be proposed, one relying on a duty in equity and the other relying on a 
duty in tort. The two measures require different statutory provisions to be enacted. The proposed duty 
in equity would resemble the current approach used in undue influence cases. A statutory duty could be 
imposed on B; not to ensure that C was given independent legal advice as in undue influence cases, but 
to conduct reasonable investigations as to the situation of C and ascertain the nature of the contract 
between A and C. The duty would not apply where B was unaware of the existence of C, but B would 
be required to conduct reasonable investigations as to that point where he suspected that C (as a class 
of persons) might be involved.  
If the duty was breached, the first step would be to determine the relative fault of the parties. 
Then, the losses due to each party should be calculated in proportion to such relative fault. A new 
statutory mechanism would be required for determining the relative fault and it is suggested that the 
existing Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (‘LRCNA’) could be modified to fulfil this 
role. As it is impractical to expect the banks to retain the property indefinitely, the default position 
would be that C should get the fee simple of the property, but only if C pays B a sum corresponding to 
B’s share of the losses.   If C fails to pay this sum, then B would be allowed to enforce the security, but 
must then pay C a sum corresponding to C’s share of the losses. This model requires three new 
statutory mechanisms: 1) the power to order the conveyance of the property to C; 2) the power and 
mechanism to determine relative fault; and 3) the power to apportion losses.  
Alternatively, the tort model involves the creation of a statutory duty of care on the part of B. 
B would be under a duty to C to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether C exists if he has reason to 
suspect it, and then to conduct reasonable investigations as to the situation of C, including ascertaining 
the nature of the contract between A and C. The standards expected by the duty in equity and tort 
should be similar in practice.  
If the duty was breached, the LRCNA 1945, s 1(1)93 could be applied directly to the case. 
The interpretation of ‘fault’ in s 494 is wide enough to include relative fault as considered in this 
situation. It is unlikely that the facts of such cases will be sufficient to persuade the courts to grant an 
order of specific performance that B not act in contravention of C’s beneficial interests in the property. 
Thus, a statutory provision is likely to be necessary to provide for discretion to exercise this power. As 
noted earlier, it is impractical to expect the bank to hold onto the property indefinitely. The default 
position would be that the courts would order that B convey the fee simple of the property to C; 
provided that C pays B a sum corresponding to B’s share of the losses. If C fails to pay this sum, then 
B would be allowed to enforce the security, but must then pay C a sum corresponding to C’s share of 
the losses. This model requires two new statutory mechanisms: 1) the creation of a statutory duty of 
care owed by B to C; and 2) the power to order the conveyance of the property to C. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 s 1(1): Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other 
person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person 
suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court 
thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage. 
94 ‘Fault’ means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or 
would, apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence. 
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The two models have some shortcomings. The equity model runs into the problem that TSB 
v Camfield still does not allow apportionment of loss, requiring express statutory intervention to get 
around this problem. The tort model has the advantage of utilising the well-established rules in the 
LRCNA but requires the creation of a statutory duty of care. In practice, their effects should be 
similar. Also, if the models are narrowly drafted such that they apply only to ‘sale and rent back’ 
transactions, they can be criticised on the grounds that they are unprincipled. If they are broadly 
drafted to include fraud in property cases in general, then they are likely to create too much uncertainty 
in the home loans and mortgages market. In addition, there are complications arising from the fact 
that both B and C expected A to hold onto the property and perform his obligations to the two of 
them. With A out of the picture, B cannot be expected to hold onto the property until C’s proprietary 
interest runs out. C similarly cannot be forced to buy the property. These models can deal with the 
allocation of pecuniary losses, but at best aid C in getting his property back. There are no guarantees at 
that point. Nevertheless, they represent models which could feasibly work if Parliament is willing to 
bear the costs mentioned above. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
At a superficial level, Scott seems to promise a departure from the orthodoxy of the single indivisible 
transaction. Where in the past conveyances and mortgages were part of an indivisible whole (for this 
category of cases), Scott suggests that they may now be divisible ‘depending on the facts’.95 Where there 
was rigid insistence on an ‘all or nothing approach’, Scott now suggests a middle approach where 
burden of the losses of the transaction may be apportioned based on the grounds that ‘innocence is a 
comparative concept’.96  
However, once we look at the substance of those statements, we realise that they provide little 
by way of guidance for their application. As mere obiter dicta, it is unlikely that subordinate courts will 
attempt to rely on these statements in distinguishing the cases before them from the orthodoxy 
approved by no less than the House of Lords.97 The lack of clear guidance as to the meanings of these 
statements coupled with very plausible narrow interpretations only makes their task more difficult. 
This means that Scott as it currently stands is unlikely to have any impact on the law. The single 
indivisible transaction seems to remain indivisible as ever.  
It may be just as well that this is so. From both theoretical and pragmatic standpoints, the 
Supreme Court seems to have arrived at a reasonable decision in their judgments. One can feel a great 
sympathy for the victims involved while recognising that sympathy need not translate into legal rights 
or even evoke feelings of injustice. Apportioning losses between (largely) innocent parties is not an easy 
task and what the Law Commission and Parliament think as to its feasibility has already been 
established.  
Objectively speaking, if the victims can obtain compensation for their losses,98 then the loss of 
their property (while serious) may not constitute a grave injustice. If Parliament is willing to intervene, 
it is submitted that their focus should be on giving the victims an opportunity to buy their houses back 
(suffering some losses), rather than on attempting to apportion the losses between the parties. The 
former approach may actually stand a chance of being enacted into law. It is certain that we have not 
heard the last word on this issue, however one gets the general impression that the significant 
commercial implications on the home loans market mean that there will be much discussion on this 
issue, but very little actual change.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Scott (n 4) [115]. 
96 ibid. [122]. 
97 Cann (n 2). 
98 Scott (n 4) [24]. 
